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 The Impact of Locating Production Abroad
on Activities at Home: Evidence from German
Firm-Level Data?
J¨ orn Kleinert a and Farid Toubal b
Abstract
We analyze whether ﬁrms that establish their ﬁrst aﬃliate in a foreign coun-
try have a diﬀerent pattern of growth in output, employment, capital and
productivity than ﬁrms that remain national. We use ﬁrm-level data on Ger-
man multinational activities and appropriate matching techniques to compare
the performance of German multinational ﬁrms with their national counter-
parts. We do not ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of ﬁrm’s decision to establish a foreign
aﬃliate on growth in its employment at home. There is also no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the internationalization decision of German ﬁrms on other measures
of activities at home.
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The rapid engagement of German ﬁrms in Eastern European countries has
received a lot of attention in German medias. It has been often argued that
this internationalization process might explain the slow down of economic
growth in Germany and the increase in unemployment. This view contrasts
with the empirical picture presented in Becker et al. (2005). They show that
the expansion of foreign activities of German ﬁrms has been accompanied by
an increase in these ﬁrms output and employment in Germany. Becker et al.
(2005) report that the increase of 56% in employment of German multinational
ﬁrms’ foreign aﬃliates has gone along with an increase of 50% in domestic
employment of German multinational ﬁrms between 1996 and 2001.
From a theoretical point of view, it is not clear whether engaging in produc-
tion abroad should have a positive or a negative eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s activities
at home. According to Hanson et al. (2005), the positive or negative correla-
tion depends on the degree of complementarity between foreign and domestic
stages of production. If foreign production substitutes partly domestic stages
of production, then engaging in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) reduces ﬁrm’s
domestic activity. However, many foreign activities aim at enlarging the mar-
ket of domestic ﬁrms. In this case, foreign and domestic productions share
complementarities.
Moreover, increasing activities abroad might eﬀect ﬁrm’s productivity at least
for three reasons. First, the relocation of production stages might increase
productivity through a better allocation of resources. Second, specialization
might increase productivity through scale economies and/or learning. Third,
activities abroad might expose the ﬁrm to new technologies, ideas and knowl-
edge which can be used at home as well. For all of these reasons, sales of
1the ﬁrm increase. This raises factor demand which may overcompensated the
reduction in factor demand which stems from the relocation of production
stages to the foreign country.
In this paper, we use detailed ﬁrm-data to analyze whether the internation-
alization of German ﬁrms has altered their activities at home. We compare
activities of ﬁrm that have engaged in FDI (henceforth, multinational ﬁrms)
to activities of domestic ﬁrm that do not have aﬃliates abroad (henceforth,
national ﬁrms). Yet, activities of national and multinational ﬁrms are not eas-
ily comparable since the group of multinational ﬁrms is not a random draw
from the whole population of ﬁrms. According to Helpman et al. (2004), a
ﬁrm self-selects into this group when it reaches a certain threshold level of
productivity. National and multinational ﬁrms diﬀer thus ex-ante. Diﬀerences
in their performance can therefore not only be related to their international-
ization decision.
We tackle this problem by applying a matching approach. We identify all
national ﬁrms that become multinational in our sample period and ﬁnd their
closest neighbors among the group of national ﬁrms that do not switch. There-
fore, switchers and their closest neighbors do not diﬀer ex-ante. The diﬀerences
in their ex-post performance can be directly related to their foreign activities.
We combine this matching approach with a diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimation
methodology proposed by Heckman et al. (1997). This estimation method-
ology allows comparing the change in performances of a switcher with the
change in performances of a national ﬁrm during the sample period.
The combination of both techniques to analyze the eﬀect of locating produc-
tion abroad on ﬁrm-level performance at home has been used in the empirical
literature before. Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2003) do not ﬁnd a nega-
tive eﬀect of the decision of Italian ﬁrms to locate production abroad on their
2domestic employment. This result is also found by Hijzen et al. (2006) using
French ﬁrm-level data. Both papers report a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect of
becoming a multinational ﬁrm on domestic productivity and on employment
of these ﬁrms. Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2003) have investigated the channel
through which this increased productivity might have occurred. They show
in a study of Austrian ﬁrms that investing abroad has a positive impact on
investment in intangible assets and on R&D. Finally, Barba Navaretti et al.
(2006), analyzing the behavior of French and Italian ﬁrms, diﬀerentiate the
impact of locating their production abroad according to the countries of desti-
nation. They do not ﬁnd any evidence for a negative eﬀect of FDI in developing
countries on activities at home.
Using the same methodology and German ﬁrm-level data, we also ﬁnd a posi-
tive eﬀect on domestic employment performance for ﬁrms that become multi-
nationals. However, we argue that this result might be partly driven by an
unappropriate matching technique. Comparing as in the previous literature a
switcher active in the textile industry in 1998 to a local ﬁrm active in machin-
ery and equipment in 2002 is obviously not convincing even if the algorithm
ﬁnds that the latter is the closest match with respect to all observable char-
acteristics including time and sector dummies. We propose therefore a novel
methodology that allows to control for the panel structure of our data. We
split the sample into eighty sector-year combinations to make sure, that the
matched national ﬁrms are active in the same industry and are compared in
the same year. This matching technique takes thereby into account also eﬀects
that can be related to business cycles and market structure.
Controlling for these eﬀects allows estimating an unbiased impact of the loca-
tion of production abroad on ﬁrm-level domestic performances. We do not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant impact of locating production abroad on ﬁrm-level employment
3as it is taken for granted in the public debate.
This paper has four additional sections. In Section 2, we discuss the rational
behind the eﬀect of locating production abroad on ﬁrm-level domestic perfor-
mance. In Section 3, we explain the estimation methodologies. In Section 4,
we present and discuss the results. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Theoretical Background
The theoretical literature on FDI views multinational ﬁrms as the integration
of diﬀerent functions that can be separated and located in diﬀerent countries.
The ﬁrm is represented by a production or a cost function that describes a
process of at most three stages that leads to the production of one single good.
The economy is described by a static framework without productivity changes.
The reallocation of production stages in the foreign country necessarily yield a
reduction of ﬁrm-level employment at home, when ﬁrms that relocate are ver-
tical in nature. In horizontal ﬁrm models, foreign aﬃliate production replaces
exports and reduces the labor demanded by the parent ﬁrms at home. In both
cases, more labor might be necessary to coordinate the activities at the level
of the headquarter but these gains in employment can not fully compensate
for the losses at the production stages.
Yet, the relocation of some stages of production in foreign countries does not
necessarily reduce value added of a ﬁrm at home. Suppose for example a ﬁrm
relocates a production stage which accounts for 15% of the value added to a
foreign aﬃliate. All else equal, this reduces its value added at home by 15%.
But let the relocation reduce the price of the good produced by the ﬁrm by 5%.
Suppose the price elasticity of demand is 3 at home and 4 in other countries.
Suppose further, that the ﬁrm exports half of its output. Falling prices yield
417.5% higher demand of the good which yields 14.875% higher value added at
home. Higher demand for the good which is induced by the lower price almost
compensates for the 15% loss of value added at home due to the relocation
of production in this example. The gains might be much higher, if the lower
prices allow for instance to enter a new export market. Thus, value added and
therefore employment does not need to fall in reaction to the relocation of
production.
That is even more true if the benchmark is a diﬀerent one. Suppose the ﬁrm
has decided not to relocate production to the foreign countries but a com-
petitor did. Increased price competition would lead to falling market shares of
the non-relocating ﬁrm. Hence, value added and employment fall. Some ﬁrms
might even exit the market. Compared to this benchmark, positive eﬀects of
relocation of production are more likely.
There are also other kinds of activities abroad than production. Many ﬁrms
invest abroad to expand in foreign markets. About a third of all foreign aﬃl-
iates of German multinational ﬁrms, for instance, are classiﬁed in retail and
wholesale. Investments abroad in these activities directly increases activities
at home. Similarly, investment in other service sectors abroad, such as business
services or ﬁnance might be export enhancing activities.
We look at eﬀects of a ﬁrm’s engagement abroad on its own activities at home.
That allows to evaluate the average eﬀects of relocations with respect to the
acting ﬁrm. It does not include eﬀects on competitors and general equilibrium
eﬀects through changes in aggregate income. We therefore abstain from any
welfare considerations.
53 Econometric Methodology
The aim of the analysis is to estimate the average (treatment) eﬀect of switch-
ing to foreign production on a ﬁrm’s performance at home, deﬁned as
ATE = E (Y |D = 1) − E (Y |D = 0) (1)
The outcome variable Y represents the ﬁrm’s domestic outcome: employment,
investment and output. While D = 1 indicates that the ﬁrm has switched to
become a multinational, D = 0 indicates that the ﬁrm has not switched. The
average treatment eﬀect ATE in equation (1) is the diﬀerence between the
performance paths of a switcher and the analogous outcome of the same ﬁrm
if it would have chosen to remain national. Of course, this is not observable.
Thus, we need to ﬁnd an approximation for the unobservable performance
outcome Y |D = 0. The main problem is to estimate equation (1) with a
random sample on Y and D, where D is a dummy variable that contains the
information whether the ﬁrm is a multinational or a national ﬁrm if, as in our
case, D is not independent of Y .
3.1 Estimation Strategy
The matching technique is a way of construct this missing counterfactual
by drawing comparisons conditional on a vector X of observable ﬁrm-level
characteristics. The underlying assumption for the validity of the procedure
is that conditional on the observable characteristics, the treated (switching
ﬁrms) and non-treated ﬁrms (those remaining national) would exhibit a similar
performance under the same circumstances.
Let the subscripts 0 and 1 indicate the time before and after switching, re-
spectively. The matching approach yields unbiased estimates, if the switch-
6ing is independent of the mean of the outcome Y , or E(Y0|D) = E(Y0) and
E(Y1|D) = E(Y1). To see this, we rewrite equation (1):
E (Y |D = 1) − E (Y |D = 0)=E (Y0|D = 1) − E (Y0|D = 0) (2)
+E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1)
=[E (Y0|D = 1) − E (Y0|D = 0)] + ATT
ATT stands for the average treatment eﬀect on the treated, i.e. the switch-
ing ﬁrms. That is exactly the diﬀerence we are interested in. However, mean
independence is a strong assumption. Firm self-select into the group of multi-
national ﬁrms on the basis of criteria that are not independent of our outcome
Y . Hence, D and Y are not independent as necessary for equation (2) to de-
liver an unbiased estimator for the ATT. Fortunately, we can ﬁnd observable
characteristics, X, to wipe out the correlation between D and Y . If the vari-
ables in X determine switching, Y is mean independent of D, conditional on
X (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)).
E (Y1 − Y0|D,X)=(E (Y1|D = 1,X) − E (Y0|D = 0,X)) (3)
−(E (Y0|D = 1,X) − E (Y0|D = 0,X))
The second diﬀerence in equation (3) is the selection bias from above, which is
assumed to be zero conditional on X. It represents the diﬀerence between the
outcome of multinational ﬁrms, before they have switched, and those ﬁrms
that remained national ﬁrms. If the selection bias represented by the second
term is zero for given realizations of the vector X, then we are left with only
the partial eﬀect of switching. In other words, the diﬀerence in performance
between multinational ﬁrms and the selected control group of national ﬁrms
is a consistent estimate of the causal eﬀect under the matching assumption.
Hence, if our matching process is successful, we can give a causal interpretation
to the average performance diﬀerence between treatment and control ﬁrms.
A negligible selection bias requires the ex-ante diﬀerence in performances of
7switching ﬁrms and control group ﬁrms to be small. Thus, we look for twins
of each switching ﬁrm among all domestic ﬁrms that have not switched. By
twin, we mean a ﬁrm that has very similar characteristics along all observable
criteria. We can then compare the ex-post performance of the switching ﬁrm
with those of the twin national ﬁrm that has not switched.
3.2 Data
In order to build both groups, we merge information from two databases.
The ﬁrst one, the MiDi (MIcro data base Direct Investment), contains panel
information on the foreign activity of German multinational ﬁrm since 1996.
The second one, Dafne contains information on the balance sheet and income
statement of 50,018 German ﬁrms since the early eighties.
We start by coding all ﬁrm that establish their ﬁrst foreign aﬃliate from
the ﬁrm-level Midi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank (see Lipponer, 2002
for a comprehensive description of the database). MiDi provides a detailed
breakdown of the foreign assets and liabilities of German multinational ﬁrms
abroad. German foreign direct investment is deﬁned as the direct or indirect
ownership or control by a single German entity of at least ten percent of the
voting securities of an incorporated foreign ﬁrm or the equivalent interest in an
unincorporated foreign ﬁrm. The database comprise information on all foreign
aﬃliates of German multinational ﬁrms from 1996 to 2004.
We ﬁnd 936 switching ﬁrms over the period 1997-2003. Unfortunately, only
402 of them are included in the Dafne database. 1 Dafne holds information on
the year of establishment of the ﬁrm, several categories of its assets, its sales,
proﬁts, expenses and the number of employees. To these variables we add the
1 About 30% of the German parent ﬁrms in the MiDi database are also listed in
the Dafne database.
8information whether a ﬁrm is a (i) multinational over the whole period or a
(ii) national ﬁrm over the whole period or a (iii) ﬁrm that switches during
the period. Dafne does not cover all information for each ﬁrm every year.
Table 1 summarizes information on the number of national, switchers and
multinational ﬁrms in our sample for each year between 1997 and 2003.
Table 1
Number of switchers
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Switchers 44 48 67 85 76 46 36
Multinationals 547 647 862 978 1169 1612 1749
National ﬁrms 3220 4846 7518 8174 11062 20777 26835
In sum, our sample covers information on 2,766 multinational ﬁrms. The con-
trol group has been constructed from a large set of 47,252 German national
ﬁrms. On average, national ﬁrms, switchers, and multinational ﬁrms have dif-
ferent characteristics. In terms of factor input for instance, multinational ﬁrms
are larger than switchers which are themselves larger than national ﬁrms. Ta-
ble A1 in Appendix provides some descriptive statistics.
3.3 Propensity Score Matching
As argued above switching is not random. We therefore construct a control
group with includes ﬁrms that have the same characteristics as the switchers
to minimize the diﬀerences in observed heterogeneity among both groups.
The matching approach requires comparing switching ﬁrms and national ﬁrms
across a number of observable pre-switching characteristics. It is desirable to
perform the matching on the basis of a single index that captures all the
information from the vector X of observable characteristics to reduce the
dimensionality problem. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that all
the information of the observable variables in the X vector is included in one
propensity score when using a probit estimation. The same applies to a logit
9estimation. We use the probability to be a multinational ﬁrm as matching
criteria. The endogenous variable in our logit estimation is one if a ﬁrm is a
multinational ﬁrm in a particular year and a zero otherwise. We use proﬁts,
age, age squared, employment, physical capital, and the debt equity ratio of the
ﬁrm and sector and year dummies to predict whether a ﬁrm is a multinational
or not. The results of the logit model are given in Table 2.
Table 2






age2 1.42 10−6 9.07 10−6
ln(physical capital) 0.713*** 0.034
ln(ﬁxed assets) -0.418*** 0.032
debt-equity ratio -0.001 0.001
ln(wage bill) 0.154*** 0.052
Observations 68072
Pseudo R2 0.42
We use the estimated coeﬃcients to predict the probability of a ﬁrm to become
multinational and match switchers and non-switcher according to this propen-
sity. For the matching, we can chose between three diﬀerent methodologies:
nearest neighbor matching, kernel matching, and local linear regressions. In
simulation studies, kernel matching (KM) and local linear regressions (LLR)
outperform nearest neighbor matching approaches (Fr¨ ohlich, 2004). This is
particularly the case when the control group is large, as in our case. The KM
and LLR techniques use the whole distribution of ﬁrms’ performance instead
of an ex-ante deﬁned subsample of the control group. Thereby, an endogenous
weight is given to each ﬁrm in the control group that depends on its dis-
tance from the treated (i.e. switching) ﬁrm. We present estimates from LLR
to compare our results to the studies using data from France and Italy.
10We also use the nearest neighbor methodology. We thereby always match one
switching ﬁrm to the three ﬁrms from the control group which are closest to the
switcher according to the propensity score, i.e. we use three nearest neighbor
matching. We decided to use three nearest neighbor matching because the
control group to our switchers is large enough to guarantee several very near
neighbor to each switching ﬁrm. Using three nearest neighbors reduces the
inﬂuence of outliers in the sample of the control group. We use three nearest
neighbor methodology additional to local linear regressions, because when
applying the nearest neighbor matching algorithms we can match switchers to
control group ﬁrms in 80 subsamples separately and recombine the subsamples
again afterwards. Thus, outcomes are compared for the same year and between
ﬁrm from the same sector.
3.4 Reliability of the Propensity Score Matching
The propensity score matching method provides a reliable and robust method
for estimating the eﬀect of locating production abroad on domestic employ-
ment if, conditional on the propensity score, the potential outcomes Y0|D = 1
and Y0|D = 0 are independent of the incidence of switching. Under the as-
sumption of independence conditional on observable variables, the pre-investment
variables should be balanced between the multinational and the national ﬁrms.
We follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Smith and Todd (2005) in veri-
fying whether the balancing condition is satisﬁed by the data.
We use two ways to show that conditional on the propensity score, the out-
comes Y are independent on the decision to switch. One way is to show that
switching ﬁrms and the ﬁrms in the control group are ex-ante not statisti-
cally diﬀerent. To show that switching ﬁrms and ﬁrms in the control group
are not statistically diﬀerent after matching, we compare various characteris-
11tics for equality of the means. The comparisons are given in Table A2 in the
Appendix.
The other way is to show that conditional on the propensity score (PS) the
dummy variable D containing the information whether a ﬁrm is a switcher
does not hold any information for the variables in the X vector. We test this
by regressing the propensity score, some polynomial of higher order, and the
interaction of the propensity score and a dummy variable (D) indicating a
switching ﬁrm on the variable of the X vector. We used regression (4) to test
for independence of the switching decision from the X vector variables.
xj =β0 + β1PS + β2(PS)
2 + β3(PS)
3 (4)
+β4D + β5PS ∗ D + β6(PS ∗ D)
2 + β7(PS ∗ D)
3 + η
xj denotes a variable from the vector X of observable characteristics. D takes
the value one if the ﬁrm is a switcher and zero otherwise. η denotes the error
term. The control group is properly chosen in the sense that the switching
decision is independent from the outcome variable y0 if the coeﬃcients β4,
β5, β6 and, β7 are jointly insigniﬁcant. Table (3) reports the F values of joint
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients β4, β5, β6 and, β7 from regression 4 for the
variables xi from the X vector.
Table 3
Balancing Test: nearest neighbor matching
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbor Nearest Neighbor
F-Test F-Test
Variable (p-value) Balanced (p-value) Balanced
Proﬁts 0.50 yes 0.79 yes
Output 0.60 yes 0.99 yes
Age 0.00 no 0.00 no
Age squared 0.05 no 0.00 no
Physical capital 0.13 yes 0.45 yes
Tangible assets 0.41 yes 0.30 yes
Debt equity ratio 0.92 yes 1.00 yes
Wage Bill 0.11 yes 0.88 yes
12Table 3 shows that our control group does not diﬀer in observable charac-
teristics from the group of switching ﬁrms. With respect to the chosen ﬁrm
characteristics we have found twins to the group of switching ﬁrms. The par-
tial eﬀect of switching is not biased by ﬁrm characteristics. Thus, both tests
indicate that the balancing condition is satisﬁed in our matched sample. The
propensity score speciﬁcation we have chosen is eﬀective in accounting for
factors that determine selection into the group of multinational ﬁrms.
3.5 Evaluation: Event Study and Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence Analysis
We follow the microeconomic evaluation literature (Heckman et al. (1997); De-
hejia and Wahba (2002)) and compare the average in the performance change
of the switchers and the non-switchers. We apply two approaches to estimate
the partial eﬀect of switching on the performance of ﬁrms at home. First, we
use the event study technique and compare average diﬀerences in the perfor-








∆Yi and ∆Yj stand for the growth rate of the performance measure after
switching for the switching ﬁrms and of ﬁrms from the control group, respec-
tively. Ni denotes the number of switching ﬁrms, Nj the number of ﬁrms in
the control group.
Second, we use a diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimator comparing average diﬀer-
ences in pre- and post-event performances of both groups. This techniques
requires more information on the status of the ﬁrm before it switches. How-
ever, the diﬀerence in diﬀerence analysis controls for unobserved heterogeneity.
Having controlled for the non-random switching decision, unobserved hetero-
13geneity could still bias our results. Such unobserved heterogeneity might result
from ﬁrm speciﬁc organizational structures, special market condition or man-
agement skills. The diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimator allows controlling for all
non-random elements of the switching decision that are time invariant and
persistent over time (Smith and Todd, 2005). The remaining unobserved het-
erogeneity is averaged out by the large sample.
The DID estimator compares the diﬀerence β between changes between the




∆Yi1 − ∆Yi0 −
X
j
∆Yj1 − ∆Yj0 (6)
∆Yi0 and ∆Yi1 denote the growth rate of the performance of switching ﬁrms
before and after switching, respectively.
4 Results
4.1 Matching using the whole sample of national ﬁrms as control group
First, we present results from event studies and diﬀerence in diﬀerence esti-
mations of a sample in which switching ﬁrms are matched to all ﬁrms with
endogenous weight. The advantage of using LLR over the nearest neighbor
regressions techniques is that it generates the correct standard errors through
bootstrapping. The results of the LLR are very close to the nearest neighbor
matching with 3 or 5 nearest neighbor when we use the best matches according
to the propensity score from the whole sample.
Our ﬁndings on employment changes at home are comparable to the results
from other studies using Italian ﬁrms (Barba Navaretti and Castellani, 2004)
or French ﬁrms (Hijzen et al. 2006). The results are given in Table 4.
14The results with respect to employment are similar to the other studies. The
decision to establish a ﬁrst foreign aﬃliate aﬀects employment at home posi-
tively. In contrast to the other studies, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant results for output
and productivity growth.
Table 4
Growth of domestic activities: Local linear regressions, standard matching
Period Employment Output Capital TFP
t+1 0.059∗∗ 0.036 0.075∗∗∗ 0.030
(0.023) (0.037) (0.027) (0.022)
t+2 0.096∗∗ -0.020 0.037 -0.048
(0.042) (0.057) (0.064) (0.047)
Switchers t + 1 99 188 191 89
Controls t + 1 9,048 42,011 42,272 8,319
Switchers t + 2 82 143 146 71
Controls t + 2 5,723 20,226 20,700 5,077
1000 replication bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
The estimates show that the average eﬀect of the decision to locate activities
abroad on domestic employment is positive. The average growth rate of em-
ployment at home is higher than the average growth rate of the national ﬁrms
in the control group. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Concerning
the second year, the diﬀerences is also positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Growth in capital is signiﬁcantly positive in the ﬁrst year after switching and
insigniﬁcant in the second. There is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the international-
ization decision on output, capital used or total factor productivity (TFP). 2
The results conﬁrm the ﬁndings by Barba Navaretti et al. (2006) for French
and Italian ﬁrms. The employment eﬀect found for French and for Italian ﬁrms
are signiﬁcantly positive. Additionally, in Barba Navaretti et al. there is also
evidence that Italian ﬁrms’ total factor productivity and output are positively
aﬀected by the decision to establish the ﬁrst aﬃliate abroad.
Controlling for unobserved time invariant eﬀects by applying a diﬀerence in
2 Total factor productivity is computed using the methodology of Olley and Pakes
(1996).
15diﬀerence estimator changes the results quite a bit. Using this technique, we
can be sure that any eﬀect that might bias the results is canceled by double
diﬀerentiating growth rates. We present the results in Table 5. Notice that
we are interested in change of growth rates of the outcomes between both
groups. Moreover, the two groups are no random draws but matched groups
that include ex ante twins. The mean comparison of the two groups show
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects on the change in capital growth in both periods.
Productivity growth is positively aﬀected in the ﬁrst period while change of
employment and output growth remain unaﬀected.
Table 5
Growth of domestic activities: Local linear regressions, diﬀerence in diﬀerence
Period Employment Output Capital TFP
t+1 0.099 -0.065 -0.253∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.130) (0.082) (0.063) (0.047)
t+2 0.146 -0.080 -0.330∗∗∗ -0.087
(0.170) (0.062) (0.100) (0.110)
Switchers t + 1 56 118 124 50
Controls t + 1 4,899 19,611 20,120 4,416
Switchers t + 2 47 100 106 41
Controls t + 2 3,271 11,512 11,935 2,831
1000 replication bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
The eﬀect of the decision to establish a ﬁrst aﬃliate abroad on employment
is insigniﬁcantly positive for both years. We can therefore rule out a negative
eﬀect on employment at home in our sample. Recall that the sample includes a
signiﬁcant fraction of all ﬁrm that decided to become multinational ﬁrms over
the period of analysis. The MiDi database comprises all German ﬁrms that
hold FDI, 30% of these ﬁrms are also in the Dafne database. We are therefore
conﬁdent that the estimated eﬀect is the average eﬀect of the establishment
of the ﬁrst foreign aﬃliate of German ﬁrms on their employment at home.
The eﬀect is non-negative. We do not ﬁnd any job export from switchers. This
result is in line with the evidence presented for France and Italy.
To get an impression how large are the ”globalization gains” in employment
16implied by the results from the standard matching we look at the absolute
numbers of the group averages. The average switcher in our sample has 2152
employees. After becoming a multinational ﬁrm, employment of this group
has grown by 3.1% while employment of the control group, which was shown
to be statistically identical prior to the switching, has fallen by 2.7% in the
ﬁrst year after switching. The growth diﬀerence of 5.9% points amounts to an
absolute average increase of 127 employees per ﬁrm. We analyze 99 ﬁrms with
employment data for the year of switching and the following year. The total
number of employment growth in the ﬁrst year in our sample amount thus to
12,573 employees resulting from the decision to become a multinational ﬁrm.
In the second year, the additional employment has grown to 206.6 employ-
ees per ﬁrm on average, or total employment of 20,453. Assuming that this
growth diﬀerence applies to all switching ﬁrms, the decision to establish the
ﬁrst aﬃliates abroad increases employment in all 936 German parent ﬁrms by
118,872 employees in the ﬁrst year after the decision. This number rises to
193,378 in the second year, which is an impressive number.
4.2 Matching within groups: Controlling for business cycle and sector speciﬁc
eﬀects
We present the results from event studies and diﬀerence in diﬀerence estima-
tion from a sample in which ﬁrms are matched using a diﬀerent matching
procedure. We construct 8 sectors (light industries, heavy industries, machin-
ery, utilities, retail & wholesale, ﬁnance, business services, real estate) and
split the sample into 10 years from 1995 onward. Within each sector and for
each year, we match the switcher to their nearest neighbors and recombine the
matches to estimate the average treatment eﬀects on the treated. We apply
a 3 nearest neighbor matching. Using one or ﬁve neighbors instead does not
17change qualitatively the results. 3 We report the results of the event study
analysis in Table 6.
Table 6
Growth of domestic activities: 3 Nearest neighbor matching in 80 groups, standard
matching
Period Employment Output Capital TFP
t+1 0.023 -0.014 0.019 -0.028
(0.041) (0.045) (0.035) (0.036)
t+2 0.097 -0.065 -0.026 -0.086
(0.065) (0.065) (0.073) (0.055)
Switchers t + 1 99 188 191 89
Controls t + 1 263 505 514 230
Switchers t + 2 82 143 146 71
Controls t + 2 212 383 392 184
bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
The number of ﬁrms in the control group is much lower in 3 nearest neighbor
matching than in LLR. Thus, the standard errors in Table 6 are larger than in
Table 4. The diﬀerences in the coeﬃcient result from the fact that the group
average of the control group ﬁrms diﬀers. The eﬀect of the internationalization
decision of employment is positive but insigniﬁcant using the 3 nearest neigh-
bor group speciﬁc matching. There are no signiﬁcantly diﬀerences between
the groups for any of the other outcomes. This results from the group speciﬁc
matching. 3 nearest neighbor matching using the nearest neighbors from the
whole sample yields results very similar to the LLR above.
In Table 7, we report the results of the diﬀerence in diﬀerence analysis. The
advantage of this analysis is that it controls for unobserved time constant
characteristics that might be correlated with the internationalization decision.
The disadvantage is that the data requirements is higher, since controlling
for unobserved characteristics requires pre-decision data. Unfortunately, these
data are not available for all ﬁrms. Hence, the number of ﬁrms in both groups
drops considerably. 4 The estimates show that the average causal eﬀect of
3 The results are available upon request
18locating production abroad on employment is positive but not signiﬁcant in
the ﬁrst and in the second year after locating activities abroad. Output and
capital growth are signiﬁcantly negative, in contrast. Total factor productivity
is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the internationalization decision.
Table 7
Growth of domestic activities: Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence Analysis
Period Employment Output Capital TFP
t+1 0.085 -0.152∗ -0.314∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.158) (0.087) (0.086) (0.083)
t+2 0.097 -0.217∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.140
(0.215) (0.117) (0.116) (0.141)
Switchers t + 1 56 118 124 50
Controls t + 1 201 350 363 173
Switchers t + 2 47 100 106 41
Controls t + 2 168 289 298 146
bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
Applying group speciﬁc matching changes the results of our analysis. The
eﬀects of the decision to establish a ﬁrst foreign aﬃliate is less positive. Positive
employment eﬀect turn insigniﬁcant and negative eﬀects on output growth
and capital growth emerge. While non-positive eﬀects on capital growth have
also been found in the Italian and French ﬁrms’ samples, we ﬁnd a negative
eﬀect on capital and output growth using the German sample. We believe that
this results is driven by the new matching technique and not by diﬀerence in
country characteristics.
Looking at the ”globalization gains” in employment again, we ﬁnd lower num-
bers. The ﬁrst year after becoming a multinational ﬁrm, employment of switch-
ers has grown by 3.5% while employment of the control group, which was
shown to be statistically identical prior to the switching, has grown only by
1.2% in the ﬁrst year after switching. The growth diﬀerence of 2.3% points
4 The diﬀerence in the results stems partly from the diﬀerence in the methodology
any partly from the change in sample size that results from limitations in the data.
Employing event studies on the smaller sample of the Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ analysis yields
results in between the two presented.
19amounts to an absolute average increase of 49.5 employees per ﬁrm. We ana-
lyze 99 ﬁrms with employment data for the year of switching and the following
year. The total number of employment growth in our sample amount thus to
4,900 employees resulting from the decision to become a multinational ﬁrm.
For all switcher, this amounts to an employment increase of 46,332. In the
second year, this increase rises to additional 195,384 employees in German
parent ﬁrms.
5 Sensitive Analysis
In the ﬁrst subsection, we split the sample with respect to the sector classiﬁ-
cation of the foreign activity. We expect the domestic post-investment perfor-
mance of ﬁrms that established a wholesale aﬃliate or a service unit to diﬀer
from a ﬁrm that established a production plant. In the second subsection, we
examine the outcome for switchers that locate activities in Central and East-
ern European countries (CEECs) and those that locate activities in Western
European countries (EU) separately.
5.1 Sample-split with respect to the sector of the foreign aﬃliate
We expect diﬀerent post-investment performances for diﬀerent activities lo-
cated abroad. For instance, we expect output and employment growth to be
positive for switchers that establish a wholesale aﬃliate or a service unit be-
cause these activities are linked to after-sales activities. In contrast, we would
expect a negative eﬀect on output and employment changes for switchers that
establish aﬃliates in manufacturing. Relocation of production is likely to be
related to lower employment growth at home.
In Table 8, we present the marginal eﬀects of the decision to become a multi-
20national ﬁrm on employment and output growth for the three groups of ﬁrms:
ﬁrms with aﬃliates in manufacturing, in wholesale and in services. The small
size of the samples does not allow for bootstrapped standard deviations in
the diﬀerence in diﬀerence case. We therefore present only the results of the
standard matching approach.
Table 8
Growth of domestic activities: Sample-split with respect to the sector of the foreign
aﬃliate, standard matching
Period Manufacturing Wholesales Services
Employment
t+1 0.065 0.061 -0.032
(0.076) (0.093) (0.090)
t+2 0.096 0.167 0.066
(0.134) (0.133) (0.120)
Switchers t + 1 38 42 36
Controls t + 1 116 96 114
Switchers t + 2 25 37 34
Controls t + 2 86 90 86
Output
t+1 -0.017 -0.032 -0.046
(0.046) (0.084) (0.094)
t+2 0.013 -0.133 -0.093
(0.098) (0.101) (0.124)
Switchers t + 1 73 76 70
Controls t + 1 211 214 177
Switchers t + 2 47 59 57
Controls t + 2 156 160 136
bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
After sample split, the sample size is probably too small to ﬁnd signiﬁcant
results. Nevertheless, the results are interesting because they show only minor
diﬀerences between the diﬀerent sub-sample. The establishment of a manu-
facturing or a wholesale aﬃliate has the same (insigniﬁcantly) positive eﬀect
on ﬁrm’s performance at home. The eﬀect has about the same size as the
positive employment eﬀect found for the whole sample. If anything, the eﬀect
is larger for the two sub-samples. The eﬀects on output are also not in line
with our expectations. There is only one positive eﬀect on output: the eﬀect
21for manufacturing aﬃliates in the second year. We expected in contrast, the
strongest negative eﬀect for ﬁrms establishing a foreign manufacturing unit.
5.2 Sample-split with respect to the host country
There are two reasons to analyze sub-samples for diﬀerent regions separately.
First, theoretical considerations suggest that locating activities in transition
countries might have very diﬀerent eﬀects on activities in Germany than locat-
ing activities in other OECD countries because the activities located abroad
diﬀer. Second, the public debate in Germany and the fear expressed is par-
ticularly concentrated on activities in close-by transition countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. Hence, we analyze two sub-samples: ﬁrms that locate
activities in CEECs and those that locate activities to EU-15 countries. The
results for employment and output eﬀects are given in Table 9.
The estimates of the eﬀect of internationalization decision do not support the
claim that locating activities in CEECs worsens the employment dynamics
in Germany. There is no diﬀerence in the employment growth of ﬁrms that
establish an aﬃliate in CEECs and their control group of national ﬁrms. The
estimated eﬀect is positive for the ﬁrst year and negative for the second. Both
are not statistically signiﬁcant. The employment eﬀect is positive in both years
and larger in size for activities in EU-15 countries. Thus, the data conﬁrms
our expectations concerning diﬀerences with respect to host countries but not
the expectations concerning the negative eﬀect of establishing an aﬃliate in
CEECs on domestic employment.
22Table 9
Growth of domestic activities: Sample-split with respect to the host country, stan-
dard matching






Switchers t + 1 29 55
Controls t + 1 67 152
Switchers t + 2 20 56






Switchers t + 1 46 102
Controls t + 1 139 280
Switchers t + 2 38 82
Controls t + 2 115 204
bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
6 Conclusion
We ﬁnd no support to the claim that activities of multinational ﬁrms abroad
exports jobs from Germany to the host countries. If anything, we ﬁnd a positive
eﬀect of the internationalization decision on employment growth at home. This
eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for all sub-samples but robust in size, and certainly
it does not result from a small number of outliers. We conclude this from a
sample of ﬁrms that decided to establish their ﬁrst aﬃliate abroad which we
matched to statistically identical ﬁrms which did not hold a foreign aﬃliate
during the whole period analyzed, i.e. from 1997 to 2003. We made sure that
switching ﬁrms and control ﬁrms from the same year and sector are matched
in our analysis. We used 3 nearest neighbor matching.
Our results are in line with studies from other countries. The direct relation-
23ship between internationalization decision of ﬁrms and the high unemployment
in Europe in general and in Germany in particular ﬁnds no support in the data.
We do not ﬁnd evidence for job exports of ﬁrms establishing aﬃliates abroad.
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267 Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics (average performance per group)
Group Multinationals Switchers National ﬁrms
ln(Proﬁts) 6.65 6.08 1.79
(4.390) (3.915) (3.079)
ln(Output) 11.40 11.34 4.32
(2.945) (2.365) (5.257)
Age 33.0 21.0 17.3
(36.87) (20.99) (21.79)
Productivity (OP) 2.87 3.03 2.6
(1.390) (1.583) (1.637)
ln(Physical capital 11.43 10.11 3.72
(3.056) (2.455) (5.438)
Debt equity ratio 10.2 50.2 23.1
(132.7) (620.1) (341.5)
ln(Employment) 6.06 6.06 4.75
(1.909) (1.428) (1.833)
standard deviations in parentheses.
Table A2: Bias reduction through matching (group speciﬁc means)
Group Switchers Control group National ﬁrms
ln(Proﬁts) 6.08 5.89 1.79
(3.915) (4.194) (3.079)
ln(Output) 11.34 11.42 4.32
(2.365) (2.279) (5.257)
Age 21.0 32.2 17.3
(20.99) (34.42) (21.79)
Productivity (OP) 3.03 3.03 2.6
(1.583) (1.320) (1.637)
ln(Physical capital 10.11 10.14 3.72
(2.455) (2.567) (5.438)
Debt equity ratio 50.2 21.8 23.1
(620.1) (189.3) (341.5)
ln(Employment) 6.06 6.05 4.75
(1.428) (1.690) (1.833)
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